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Résumé: Sur la base d'une relecture d'événements nationaux (la Charte de 
l'environnement en France) et internationaux (la guerre préventive des Etats-
Unis en l'Irak) des années 2002-2003, ce papier rappelle la confusion 
entretenue entre principe de précaution et règle d'abstention. Il montre ensuite 
qu'il n'y a guère de fondement à postuler un antagonisme radical entre les 
Etats-Unis et l'Europe dans la manière d'aborder la gestion des risques en 
pratique. Cependant, des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, on peut observer une 
opposition entre deux usages de ce principe, soit comme vecteur d'un progrès 
de la coordination internationale, soit comme justification d'initiatives 
unilatérales dérogeant à des règles communes précédemment acceptées. 
 
Abstract: Revisiting a selection of national (the Charter of the Environment in France) 
and international (the preventive war launched by the United States against 
Iraq) 2002-2003 events, the paper reminds the sustained confusion between 
two concepts: the Precautionary Principle and the Abstention Rule. It then 
supports the idea that there is no basic antagonism in practical rationalities of 
risk management across the Atlantic Ocean. But there is a fundamental 
opposition in each region between two basic usages of the Principle either to 
promote a progress in settling coordinated action for common concerns or to 
justify unilateral actions departing from an existing agreed common regime. 
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Olivier Godard -1- 
More than fifteen years after its introduction and progressive acknowledgment in parts of 
environmental international, European and domestic law, for instance in France, there is still a 
huge debate about the conceptual structure of the precautionary principle (PP) and the 
conditions and means to put it into practice. Many countries still refuse to give it a legal 
status. Meanwhile, sound elements of doctrine have been elaborated in academic and public 
administration circles, and legitimized by official statements in Europe such as the 
Communication of the Commission in February 2000 and the Resolution of the European 
Council which was held in Nice in December 2000. Moreover the SPS agreement, as 
interpreted by panels and the body of dispute resolution within the WTO setting, gives a 
substantial credit to several conceptual ingredients of the PP (Noiville, 2000). At this point it 
is necessary to clarify the main issues under the light of recent national and international 
events that may have significant impacts for the future of the governance of environmental 
and health risks. 
Among events, let us consider the Plan of Implementation adopted by the World 
Summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg in the Summer 2002, the arguments 
given by the US government to justify the 2003 war launched against Iraq, since some 
observers suggested it was a typical adoption of the PP advocated by Europeans, and the 
social debate triggered by the project of President Chirac to insert a Charter of Environment 
into the French Constitution. 
I wish to offer three main points to discussion: 
(1) There is a sustained confusion between two concepts: the Precautionary Principle and the 
Abstention rule. 
(2) There is no basic general opposition in practical rationalities for approaching risk 
management in the USA and in Europe. 
(3) There is a fundamental opposition in each region between two basic forms to dress the 
precautionary principle either as a progress in settling coordinated action for common 
concerns or a justification for unilateral actions departing from an existing agreed common 
regime. Fundamentally the PP is caught in the tension between sovereignty and collective 
rules. 
 
1. The Precautionary Principle and the Abstention Rule  
There is often confusion between two concepts. Firstly, there is the PP that requires taking an 
early, but proportionate, account of potential risks or hazards; hence the typical form of 
definitions of the principle: “lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
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postponing effective and proportionate preventive actions…” In the search of appropriate 
measures, this principle calls for the consideration of a whole range of actions, from scientific 
watch and research to provisional forbidding of the risk-generating technology or products. 
This concept is explicitly supported by the European doctrine (Commission, 2000; European 
Council, 2000). Secondly there is what I call the Abstention Rule. This apparently attractive 
rule demands to refuse any new activity, product or technology that could generate potential 
risks as long as they have not been scientifically proven to be quite safe. It is linked to the 
wrong but current idea that the main characteristic of the PP is to reverse the burden of proof 
(O’Riordan & Jordan, 1995) and that proof of no-risk should be given (Conseil d’Etat, 1998). 
The point is that the Abstention Rule is the limit of a lay conception driven by the idea that 
public action should eradicate sources of potential hazards as much as possible; for the latter 
the PP just means being much more cautious than previously justified by usual prevention. 
Next figure clearly shows the basic difference between both concepts. 
On the vertical axis Oy is the scientific time, i.e. the axis of the development of 
scientific knowledge of the background of a given hazard; on top are “known risks” y9; at the 
origin is “ignorance” y1; between them, top-down, are various degrees of emerging 
knowledge of potential risks, from very plausible but not proven hazard hypotheses to just 
scientific speculations. On the horizontal axis Ox, are set all the possible preventive actions 
that can be considered; they are ranked according to decreasing severity (x1 is forbidding; x7 
is scientific watch). So an action justified by the PP can be defined both by its timing (yi) and 
its content (xi) as A(xi,yj). 
The PP for the EU and French doctrine implies mainly a vertical translation 
downwards, i.e. from y9 to y3: hazards have to be taken into account at an early stage, without 
waiting for certain knowledge of their existence and probability. Meanwhile, if it is the case 
that there is complete ignorance on the existence of an unveiled hazard, the PP is of no use: to 
trigger the PP, potential hazards have to be identified on the basis of existing scientific work 
or empirical observations; the PP can only embrace those potential hazards for which there is 
a minimum threshold of scientific content and consistency, y3 by convention. 
The PP for lay people, especially in crisis period, is understood as a horizontal 
translation towards the origin, for instance from x7 to x2. It means taking more severe 
measures than previously felt as justified under standard prevention policies, and mainly 
forbidding or eradicating sources of risks. 
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For the eradicative approach, it seems that precautionary actions should be all the 
more severe because scientific uncertainty is high, which is the case when actions are decided 
early in the scientific time1. On the contrary, for the EU and French doctrine, low scientific 
                                                 
1 This was the view supported by Hermitte and Dormont (2000) after having revisited in 1999 the story of the 
development of the BSE health crisis in Europe: if they are to be efficient, precautionary actions should be all the 
more broad since scientific uncertainty is high. As a matter of fact Gollier, Julien & Treich (2000) developed an 
economic model that seemingly brings a rational ground for this rule: their model identifies what they call a 
“precautionary effect” linking increased savings to the prospect of increased uncertainty of future earnings. But 
this outcome depends on too specific conditions (specific preferences function of prudent agents, a cumulative 
environmental hazard, precautionary actions that transfer income to the future without imposing additional 
immediate costs, certainty of the future resolution of uncertainty) to offer a general framework for thinking out 
Figure 1 : Two concepts for the PP : early account of potential hazards 
versus more severe precautionary measures  
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plausibility could not lead to severe restrictive measures (Kourilsky & Viney, 2000) but, if 
relevant, to scientific watch and research. The higher scientific consistency and plausibility, 
the stronger precautionary actions have to be for a same level of seriousness of expected 
damage. 
The lay eradicative conception ultimately leads to the Abstention rule: public 
authorities should forbid anything that has not yet been proven to be certainly safe. That rule 
is a dead-end for two main reasons (Godard, 1997; Godard & al. 2002): first, due to the fact 
that scientific knowledge is in progress and there are always unresolved uncertainties at a 
given time, it is logically impossible to proof that something new will never bring damages in 
the future; in an imperfectly known world, it is not possible to prove a negative (Popper’s 
argument about refutability); second, it poses a general norm of no-damage that cannot belong 
to our world, due to scarcity of means and the fact that main policy issues in the field of risk 
management come to a trade-off of one risk against another risk. 
This debate has direct implications for practical issues. For instance, when the Bush 
administration asked Iraq to prove its disarmament regarding massive destruction weapons, it 
provided a good illustration of such demands of proof of no-risk and of the impossibility to 
bring it: any negative empirical test was not enough to prove the absence of threat. It has been 
widely noticed how remarkable it was that several weeks after the coalition occupied the 
whole territory of Iraq, nothing was found to this regard, although this threat was the official 
justification of the war. Unless accepting to judge the moral value actions on the ground not 
of their expected consequences but their actual consequences that reveal themselves 
afterwards in full light, by itself this absence2 does not ruin the justification of the war, but 
invites to scrutinize the ex ante justification of this action. 
In fact two lessons can be derived from this case. Firstly, it confirms that asking for a 
proof of no-risk regarding potential threats always belongs to a rhetorical exercise that hides a 
strategic purpose. The demands of the GMO opponents in Europe belong to the same deadly 
rhetoric when they ask for a proof of long run harmlessness of biotechnology before allowing 
them. Secondly, when it seems useful to them, the more radical opponents to the PP may 
easily adopt the unjustifiable caricature of this concept that they are ordinarily fighting. The 
same phenomenon has been observed in France: the physician circles that are hostile to the PP 
are also those who have contributed to disseminate the confusion between the PP and the 
Abstention rule. 
So, in spite of the fact that a rather elaborated doctrine has been built about the very 
nature of the PP and its implementation, parts of society find profitable for promoting their 
                                                                                                                                                        
the PP rationale. The Hermitte and Dormont’s rule would lead to a paralysis if it should be applied to any 
potential hazard considered at an early stage (Godard et al, 2002). 
2 By the end of May 2003. 
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projects and causes in society to push another concept under the same name. As they gain 
some political audience in some specific, well-publicized cases, politicians and governments 
are sensitive to some extent to these demands, which sustain the initial conceptual confusion. 
 
2. No basic difference in rationality of risk management between the USA and Europe 
In spite of what is sometimes said3, there is no basic general opposition of practical rationality 
in risk management between Europe and the United States. This situation originates in the 
fact the European doctrine has been developed by taking due account of international rules 
that were developed in the context of the WTO during the nineties. Nowadays opponents and 
defenders of the PP can be found in both regions and parallel groups across Atlantic share the 
same arguments. Let us give a few examples of this similarity. Look at the recent opinions of 
French Academy of Science (2003) and French Academy of Medicine (Pilet, 2003a & b; 
Tubiana, David & Sureau, 2003) against the acknowledgement of the precautionary principle 
in a Constitutional Charter of Environment in France. Such an opposition has pushed forward 
the very same types of arguments as used by the United States in international circles: the 
implementation of the principle could dangerously deviate from a science-based doctrine and 
then would become a threat for future progress of science, a source a paralysis of 
technological innovation and eventually a source of dramatic regression of society’s welfare. 
Their fears are justified if they target the Abstention rule, but there is no reason why the PP 
should produce such results. As written by the UK Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk 
Assessment in their 2002 report on the PP: “In practice the position adopted should reflect the 
commitment to sustainable development that gives full weight to economic, social and 
environmental factors. The precautionary principle should not, therefore, be an obstacle to 
innovation. Properly applied it is a positive proportionate policy tool to encourage 
technological innovation and sustainable development by helping to engender stakeholder 
confidence that appropriate risk control measures are in place” (ILGRA, 2002, p.4). 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the recent (May 2003) US decision to stop beef meat 
imports from Canada because one unique case of mad cow was recently discovered in the 
latter country demonstrates the capacity of the United States to take early and radical, maybe 
quite excessive, measures for a potential risk. Certainly, such a measure is more radical than 
any of those taken in Europe in a similar case. In another field, the President Clinton’s 
initiative, a few years ago, in 1996, to develop a concerted strategy between public authorities 
and private business to ensure critical infrastructure protection against large-scale risks and 
                                                 
3 See the discussion by Vogel (2003). Beginning with the idea that, as a pioneer of risk management, the USA let 
the lead they had until the eighties to the EU ever since, as magnified by the disputes about the precautionary 
principle, Vogel concludes that the main sources of difference are not related to different approaches and 
concepts to risk management but are due to organisational differences in regulatory regimes, and mainly to a 
higher level of pressure of public opinion in Europe regarding safety issues. 
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threats is an example of an early collective action taking seriously into account potential 
threats without waiting for a certain knowledge of hazards. A programme of preparedness and 
several new institutions have been settled as a result of this initial partnership having 
experienced intense exchange of information (Michel-Kerjan, 2003). All this effort to 
reorganise and adapt institutions for dealing efficiently with large-scale potential threats is 
now more advanced in the United States than in any other country in Europe. Such an 
approach is still expected in France in order to seriously develop what I call a Precautionary 
State, which would be to some extent analogous for the XXIst century to the development of 
the Welfare State during the XXth century in France and Europe. 
So it would be quite inappropriate to put ahead a general statement according to 
which, because of the PP, Europe and France are more advanced than the United States in risk 
management. The precautionary principle is not a key departure separating both regions in 
practice to this regard. Meanwhile, differences do exist. They concern the legal status given to 
the PP and mainly the focus of risk management. What is perceived as domains of critical 
hazards is not the same and those differences are linked to economic and political features. 
For example what is seen as a dangerous food is not defined the same way, as typified by 
attitudes regarding mineral water or cheese; confidence in safety is not derived from the same 
benchmarks. 
The most important result of comparisons is that positions adopted by governments 
depend mainly on subjects, priorities and opportunities. Whereas the United States refuses to 
hear about the PP for managing the introduction of GMOs in open fields or in food, the Bush 
administration developed an overall argument in favour of a preventive war against Iraq on 
the basis of the idea that it would not be acceptable to wait for an actual confirmation of the 
existence of the threat before taking an initiative to destroy it at source. Different topics, 
different arguments… At least, governments should be recommended to look for coherence in 
the way they put forward their arguments for tackling different issues related to hazards and 
threats. Such a requirement of coherence in risk management has been often stressed, for 
instance in the SPS agreement and in the EU doctrine on the PP. 
Let us take these two examples, GMOs and the war against Iraq, to develop the 
understanding we may have of the PP. I would suggest on a technical ground that in both 
cases, the arguments of the US administration do not fit the main requirements of the PP. Let 
us have a look! 
(a) The PP tells that preventive measures have to be based not only on scientific proofs 
but on other relevant available scientific elements (assumptions, tests, models, 
theories, and data) that give a sufficient plausibility to an assumption of hazard. In the 
case of GMOs, many sources of uncertainty still remain that are not dismissed by the 
criterion of substantial equivalence between GMO and non-GMO food. Certainly the 
O. Godard – Alliance workshop May 26, 2003  7 
proof of no-risk for health and the environment has not been brought by the US party, 
since it cannot be brought. But, EU scientists have rightly pointed out several types of 
potential risks that have to be better known, for instance regarding health impact of 
pesticides residues that may be found in higher concentrations in some GMOs, 
possibilities of genetic recombination, or genes dissemination able to impose damage 
on agricultural practice and ecosystems functions. Acknowledging these sources of 
hazards is quite legitimate under the PP, which does not necessarily imply that 
forbidding GMOs at the borders is the only appropriate answer. 
(b) The PP asks a threat of potential risk to be scientifically assessed through an 
independent, transparent, pluralistic collective expertise as a first step; the 
responsibility of organising such an expertise belongs to public authorities, but the 
results of it should be accessible to anyone concerned; it is difficult to pretend that the 
US action regarding Iraq has been based on such an independent and transparent 
expertise! On the contrary it seems that efforts have been made by the coalition to 
achieve disinformation by forging proofs of a direct link between the regime of 
Saddam Hussein and the Al-Qaida network. 
(c) The PP asks precautionary measures to be proportionate to the severity of potential 
damage but also to the plausibility of the threat and inversely to the costs of 
prevention, that include loss of benefits. This approach has several consequences: 
pure, not yet established, assumptions that do not reach a threshold of plausibility can 
certainly be considered, but may only justify measures as scientific watch, research 
and dissemination of information. That the national security of the United States was 
under a direct threat from Iraq has not been considered a plausible assumption 
worldwide and specifically by the Security Council of the United Nations. Under the 
PP concept, this assumption of threat was not plausible enough to justify a war. There 
is an additional point touching this very issue of proportionality. Most of time, the 
situation to tackle imposes a trade-off between one risk and another one: assuming that 
launching a war against Iraq was aiming at reducing a threat for US security, it would 
have been necessary to consider the new hazards generated by the choice of this means 
and test the balance between risks avoided and risks generated4. The new hazards were 
of concern not only for the USA but for the whole region and countries geographically 
nearer to Iraq. In such circumstances, distribution of risks among stakeholders and 
                                                 
4 This case is also of value to stress the importance of the reference situation chosen to establish a comparison of 
risks. Defenders of the war against Iraq often pushed forward the huge number of persons murdered by the 
regime of Saddam Hussein with the implicit idea that, without this “liberation war”, other thousands of people 
would get killed or condemned to starvation in the next decade. But when the war was triggered, the alternative 
scenario was not just a continuation of Saddam’s regime for ever; it was a continuation of inspections by UN 
inspectors for six months or so to check that no visible massive destruction weapons were stocked somewhere. 
One way or another it would have brought a change of the political situation. 
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various types of population is a legitimate concern and should have been taken into 
account in an overall balance. Think for instance of Iraqi women now exposed to new 
dangers of Islamic fundamentalism. 
(d) The PP asks precautionary measures to be conceived as provisional and easily 
reversible in order to be reconsidered on the basis of new scientific understanding and 
new data which are to be actively searched for; such an irreversible action as a war 
clearly does not fit this requirement. 
On the basis of all these elements, launching the 2003 war against Iraq cannot be seen 
as a right, balanced and mature implementation of the PP, although it may respond to other 
strategic concepts. For opposite reasons, dismissing the relevance of the PP for GMOs cannot 
be seriously defended. These are important conclusions for a better common Transatlantic 
understanding of the requirements of the PP. It is just wrong to say that this principle can 
cover any demand and any action that would target threats and hazards. In coming to my third 
point, a last lesson may be gained. 
 
3. Two basic forms of action to implement the precautionary principle  
Throughout various national and international domains in which the PP has been at stake, we 
can observe two basic opposite forms to dress it: on the one hand the PP is the basis of 
progress of coordinated action and gives rise to new regimes; on the other hand the PP feeds 
exceptions to collective rules and support unilateral actions. 
 
An extension of collective coordination and common rules 
For the first form, the principle is the vector of building a new regime of coordinated 
action to enhance environmental protection or improve safety as a public good, either at the 
national or international level. It was the case of the two Conventions adopted in 1992 at the 
Rio Summit, and a flag example of such embodiment of the PP is the 1997 Kyoto protocol, 
which set-up a sound new regime for a first step of collective action to avoid a possible 
dramatic change of the global climate. To this regard, the Johannesburg summit was rather 
regressive in relation to the acknowledgement of the PP, even if the regression has been 
veiled by a plea for sustainable development and public-private partnership. In the plan of 
implementation resulting from the summit, the PP is only mentioned twice (item 23 and 109) 
in sentences insisting upon scientific methods to elaborate policies and specifically manage 
risks generated by chemicals. Clearly some influential delegations wanted to get rid of the PP. 
So, this principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is not mentioned at all in the Johannesburg 
Declaration and when the latter considers new technologies, it is only as positive tools to 
promote development. A strange picture for a summit devoted to the harmonization of 
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environmental protection and human development! These results of Johannesburg confirm 
that progress in the international governance of risks affecting global public goods and 
environmental security has been stopped. 
Debates in France and Europe also demonstrate that we still need an improved 
collective and public organisation to address the requirements of management of potential 
hazards. To put an end to confusion and fears growing from business and physicians circles, 
we need to specify adequate procedures; we need definition of roles, obligations and rights; 
we need an identification of the type of actions to be taken according to circumstances. First 
elements have been provided in the field of food safety, thanks to various recent food crises, 
but the landscape remains rather vague in other fields. For instance, important steps have to 
be done in the field of hazards at work and professional diseases, if we put aside the nuclear 
industry who adopted the ALARA5 principle several decades ago. 
 
Exceptions and unilateral actions 
With the second form, the PP is seen as a legitimate motive for members of a society 
(citizens in a state, states within the international community) to take unilateral measures and, 
quite generally, to depart from current rules and obligations defined by a given regime of 
coordination. At the international level, this view leads to see the PP mainly as the right of a 
state to block trade flows of some specific products at the border. Think of the typical case of 
the EU stopping GMO food. The war against Iraq was also typically a unilateral and illegal 
action regarding international law (Habermas, 2003). At the domestic level in France, José 
Bové and friends who destroy GMO experimental fields share in fact the same attitude with 
the Bush administration making war to Iraq. The moral argument put forward in both cases is 
that they take their own responsibility, even that they had a duty to do so! In the same general 
line, experts who advocate the direct implementation thesis, support the idea that the PP 
generates an obligation and a right of each person (individuals, physicians, business firms and 
states…) to take measures against potential hazards she may generate or he may have heard 
about, and also for those he may think to be exposed to, even if there is no public regulation 
or agreed collective framework defining what is expected from each of them and how it 
should be done. 
In France this alternative found an echo in the recent debate about the status of the PP 
within the project of Charter of Environment (Commission Coppens, 2003). Should it be a 
binding norm to be directly applied by each and everybody, without the mediation of a public 
organisation? Or is it a law concept that empowers public authorities and only them directly, 
to take organizational and preventive measures against a potential hazard? Behind this 
                                                 
5 ALARA means : As Low As Reasonably Achievable. See the European ALARA network: 
http://ean.cepn.asso.fr/  
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alternative lie several opposite arguments. In favour of a direct implementation to all agents, 
there were three main arguments: 
(a) the PP can only be efficient if all society is involved, which in fact is 
acknowledged by all parties, the question raised being related to how each agent 
should be concerned; 
(b) the responsibility to take action should bear on those who are the most intimate 
with the generation of hazards in order to ensure an early action; 
(c) public authorities and administration services have no more the human and 
material means to efficiently cover all emergent threats. 
The opposite position was based on the following arguments (Godard, 2001b; 2003): 
(a) collective hazards affecting the environment and public health are, in economic 
words, public goods or bads; it means their management cannot be let to 
decentralised initiatives and motives of private agents, unless society is ready to 
support huge inefficiencies due to lack of coordination and common benchmarks 
to proportion actions; 
(b) most actions that should be considered under the PP typically are public 
prerogatives: organizing a scientific watch of ecosystems or large epidemiological 
studies, organizing an independent, collective scientific expertise, developing new 
research programmes on public interest issues, organizing public debates on 
acceptable levels of risks, setting-up new permitting systems, forbidding the use of 
some products, stopping imports and exports, and so on. 
(c) risk management for collective hazards involves a political responsibility that has 
to be taken by political bodies and sanctioned by political means; as said by the 
Nice Resolution, defining acceptable levels of risks imply a political judgment on 
the balance of potential damages and benefits to society. 
(d) being mainly procedural, the PP requirements are too vague to generate 
substantive obligations for private agents; direct implementation would open the 
door to a huge increase of suits, generating law insecurity, and expose each and 
everybody to a serious threat of somewhat arbitrary decisions by courts regarding 
imputation of liability; this threat would have a detrimental impact on behaviours 
of investors and managers preoccupied to protect themselves against suits; clearly 
the last fear fed the opinions of the two French Academies against giving the PP a 
constitutional value. 
At this stage, the project of Charter chosen by the government in May 2003 specifies 
that public authorities have to take measures under the PP. 
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Ambiguous achievements 
In several cases, as the protocol of Carthagena on biosafety under the Convention on 
biodiversity, both forms are entangled, since progress in coordination in a particular field 
takes the form of an agreement on the procedures and conditions in which unilateral measures 
can be taken as exceptions to current international rules. Such a way to proceed remains 
ambiguous: is it mainly about restoring sovereignty in the definition of acceptable risks 
against previously agreed common laws of trade defined within the WTO? Or is it an 
appropriate means to protect biodiversity worldwide against trade-related threats for the 
common good of mankind?  
In fact through the PP, a new balance is searched between collective rules and 
sovereign initiatives. According to issues, countries change their positions. For instance, 
France is an advocate of multilateralism in the environmental field and at the same time has 
been the first country to disregard European law in the mad cow disease crisis (Godard, 
2001a). The United States does not want to hear about multilateralism, except when an 
agreement was prepared in the OECD context to define rules protecting international 
investment against sovereign policies… Here lies the explanation why the implementation of 
the PP is still marked by such an ambiguity and huge disputes: according to issues, 
governments try to push one form against the other but do not share the same ideas on which 
form should be used for a given topic. 
Who are the legitimate sovereign entities that can claim a right to take actions for its 
own safety or for collective issues, even at the expense of the safety of other entities having 
formally the same rank? Is the PP mainly a vector of regression in international coordination 
by giving strength and legitimacy to unilateral actions? Or is it a vector of progress towards 
an increased responsibility of citizens, business, NGOs regarding collective concerns? Should 
we accept this new trend to unilateral and sovereign action, or should we try to turn the PP 
into a vector of progress in collective governance of common concerns? 
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